ABSTRACT: Projections of future climate change partly depend on the assumptions made for future emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG). These emissions are typically represented through an emissions scenario that posits a particular trajectory of development for the global society over the time of the projection. Since GHG emissions have a substantial impact on climate change, a relevant issue is what theories provide a good framework for addressing the drivers of GHG. We address 2 key research questions in this context: (1) Are carbon emissions attributable to structural change? If so, is it necessary to focus on the trajectories of carbon intensity or also on total emissions? (2) Does the development path of developing countries follow that of industrialized nations (convergence hypothesis) or is it suppressed in some areas and augmented in others due to world hierarchy and heterogeneity? Two development theories that have been applied to understand the drivers of GHG emissions are the modernization theory (MT) and the world economy theory (WET). In this paper, we use a statistical cluster analysis of economic data at the country level to test these theories and explore the convergence hypothesis with respect to GDP and GHG emissions. Results show no evidence of convergence among countries' welfare and emissions in the near term as a consequence of the MT. These results suggest that caution should be exercised in using the MT as basis for developing future emissions scenarios and that more attention should be paid to the WET. 
INTRODUCTION
Projections of future climate change partly depend on the assumptions made for future emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG). These emissions are typically represented through a 'storyline' or emissions scenario that posits a particular trajectory of development for the global society over the time of the projection (IPCC 2000) . Since GHG emissions have a substantial impact on climate change, a relevant issue is what theories provide a good framework for addressing the drivers of GHG. Besides providing some basis for particular climate projections, appropriate theories can also suggest broad principles for modifying GHG emissions. Two development theories that have been applied to understand the drivers of GHG emissions are the modernization theory (MT) and world economy theory (WET). In this paper, we use a statistical cluster analysis of economic data at the country level to test these theories with respect to GHG emissions.
According to the MT; although the environmental impacts of economic growth increase in early stages of development and affluence (measured by income per capita), impacts stabilize and then decline as economies mature through structural change or modernization (Gibbs 2000 , Jung et al. 2000 , Stern 2003 , Bertinelli & Strobl 2004 ). This process is depicted by an inverted U-shaped curve, also known as the environ-mental Kuznets curve (EKC). The shape is the result of individual countries passing through stages of development, from agriculture to industry and then to services. The process, known as 'convergence', assumes all countries to follow the trajectory of the Kuznets curve and eventually end up with a mature economy with less environmental impacts.
Conversely, WET assumes that only a small number of nations may successfully move up in the international hierarchy of development (Roberts & Grimes 1997) . Rather than converging towards similar mature economies, the WET implies a world that will continue to be hierarchical and heterogeneous. This heterogeneity of development must also be associated with different capacities for managing environmental problems.
A common set of future scenarios that is widely used in simulations of future climate (Ref IPCC AR4) emphasizes the convergence hypothesis (IPCC 2000 , Fisher et al. 2007 ). The discussion of convergence or the lack thereof is relevant to climate change for at least 2 reasons.
(1) Less convergence commonly yields more GHG emissions, which may be explained by slower growth of the total factor productivity (TFP), slower capital turnover, and less technological congruence resulting in low adoption of low-emission technologies in developing countries (Fisher et al. 2007) . This feature will influence mitigation policies, as emissions could be higher than under a convergent situation. (2) The IPCC WGII (Parry et al. 2007) found that the capacity to adapt to a changed climate is influenced by such developmental factors as access to economic and natural resources, social networks, entitlements, institutions and governance. Under a convergent state, many nations will be able to cope with the impacts of climate change. Without convergence, more nations will have difficulties adapting to the local effects of global warming.
Is structural change, resulting in a less 'carbonintensive' economy, the key to curb carbon emissions; or do we also need to focus on the trajectories of total emissions? Do developing countries follow the development path of industrialized nations; or is the world hierarchical and heterogeneous? This paper aims to answer these questions by clustering countries according to developmental and economic variables. This clustering is an alternative to more traditional partitions such as developed versus developing countries, and Annex versus non-Annex nations
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. By considering carbon emissions for each cluster, it is possible to assess whether the Kuznets curve is a useful model to understand carbon emissions or if there are other important dynamics in total carbon emissions. As a broader assessment of the evidence for convergence, future tendencies in gross domestic product (GDP), GDP per capita and carbon dioxide emissions can also be examined in each cluster.
DATA AND METHODS

Data
The database compiled and distributed by the World Bank (2007) is the source for country level and annual data in this study. Although the period of record is from 1960 through 2006, and 208 countries are listed, there is a substantial amount of missing data, such that it is only feasible to consider a subset of countries. Scholars tend to agree on the relevance of the following factors as determinants of carbon emissions: population dynamics, affluence as measured by GDP per capita, and technology, as measured by carbon intensity and levels of modernization (York et al. 2003a,b) . Based on this, we focus on the following variables: GDP per capita (Year 2000 US $) (GDPcap) as an indicator of affluence, percentage of the population aged between 15 and 65 yr (PopMid) for demographic dynamics, percentage of the population living in urban environments (PopUrb) for levels of modernization, and total carbon emissions for impacts. Carbon emission per capita (CO 2 cap) was derived from the total emissions of CO 2 equivalent and the population. The choice of independent variables is also based on practicality. These variables are reported for many countries, thus reducing the potential for missing data. Although it is possible to use statistical variable selection techniques to identify subsets of variables that are good predictors of a dependent variable (e.g. CO 2 emissions), these methods require larger sample sizes than can be provided by country-level data. Prescribing a fixed set of variables that have theoretical justification is preferable in this case. The reader is referred to the World Bank (2007a) for precise definition of these variables.
The primary subset of countries that was considered includes those with a 2003 population >10 million and a complete set of variables for 2003. These criteria result in a subset of 72 countries. The countries omitted from our analysis only accounted for 7.8% of the total population and 7.1% of the CO 2 emissions in 2003.
Clustering of countries
Our statistical approach to clustering is different from the usual methods used in carbon emissions forecasting. The 2 main approaches are partitions based on region or income. For example, the Special Report on 1 Under the Kyoto Protocol, emission restrictions were made for the rich countries of Annex 1 -the biggest greenhouse gas producers, and also the countries most able to cut emissions. Targets range from an 8% cut for the EU to a 10% increase for Iceland Emissions Scenarios (SRES) as published by IPCC (IPCC 2000 (IPCC , 2007b To overcome these limitations and provide a more robust basis for grouping countries, we used some covariables that drive emissions trajectories as classification criteria, and applied hierarchical clustering (Everitt 1993) to generate groups of similar countries. We used a small set of standardized variables, deemed in the literature as key in explaining the variations in national emissions trajectories (Fisher et al. 2007 , York et al. 2008 , namely log GDP per capita, urban population and population aged 15 to 65 yr.
The hclust function in the R statistical environment (R Development Core Team 2008) was used for these calculations. Briefly, each country is assigned to its own cluster and then the algorithm proceeds iteratively, at each stage joining the 2 most similar clusters, continuing until there is just a single cluster. The criterion for similarity is related to the Euclidean distance among members compared to the distance between cluster means, and only depends on the values of the 3 standardized variables. As in any clustering exercise, the number of clusters is arbitrary. We choose to use 8 clusters from this algorithm as a compromise between having enough clusters to represent a diversity of countries, while maintaining reasonable sample sizes within each cluster. The split from 7 to 8 clusters was particularly judged to be a meaningful refinement. Fig. 1 shows the hierarchical clusters coded by a common color on pairwise scatter plots of the 3 standardized clustering variables. The cluster attributes are described as 'the haves' (green group), the 'have somes' (black, pink, and orange groups), and the 'have nots' (turquoise, red, and blue groups). A high level of correspondence exists between the 8 clusters and the World Bank classification of countries (see Table A1 ). Countries grouped under the 8 clusters and those excluded due to population size and/or missing data are shown in Tables A1 and A2 , respectively.
The clustering algorithm creates a partition of just 7 clusters by combining Groups III (pink, the 'have somes') and VI (green, the 'haves'), but creates 9 clusters by subdividing Group VI to create 2 additional groups -the first comprised of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, South Korea, the Netherlands, Spain and the United States and, the second, comprised of Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Poland and Portugal. Being able to relate clusters of size 7 and 9 to the 8-cluster result through aggregation and splitting is an advantage of hierarchical clustering. A statistical check was made to determine if the clustering could predict carbon emissions. An ANOVA was done to test if the mean trends in carbon emissions across the clusters are equal. Specifically, the 10 yr trend in CO 2 cap was determined for each country and the F statistic was compared to the randomization of the countries to the 8 clusters. A p-value of ~0.05 indicates that emission trends are not the same among clusters.
One interesting aspect of the clustering results is the grouping of countries with regional and/or cultural similarities (e.g. Colombia, Ecuador and Peru under Group I), even when these were not explicitly included among the variables for clustering. Moreover, even cluster members that are geographically separated often have other basic commonalities such as large petroleum exports (e.g. Saudi Arabia, Mexico and Venezuela under group III). Further examples of the advantages of using 3 variables for clustering are also notable. The blue 'have not' group is not separated from the turquoise cluster when only GDP per capita and percent of urban population are used. However, with the addition of the percentage of the population aged 15 to 65 yr, these two groups become delineated. On hindsight, separation into these two groups makes sense with regard to cultural and regional considerations.
As an alternative way of choosing clusters, we investigated the use of K-means clustering (Hartigan & Wong 1979 ) using the 8 hierarchical cluster centers as starting points for the algorithm. Four of the clusters remained the same, 3 had only small changes among members, but the last cluster had some significant shifting between clusters 6 and 8. One potential advantage of the K-means clustering is that it moves Indonesia into the group of other Asian countries. When random starting clusters were used, the Kmeans algorithm produced more distinctly different clusters but even in this case, the major grouping of countries suggested in the hierarchical clustering was preserved. Although there was some shuffling of cluster membership based on different clustering algorithms, we choose to use the hierarchical method because the nesting of clusters simplified the choice of cluster number. In general, the 3 variables used for clustering tend to be evenly spread, thus dividing these data into clusters may result in some ambiguity. There will always be some countries that are near boundaries between clusters that could be moved between groups with modest changes in the clustering algorithm.
EMISSIONS AND DEVELOPMENT
MT and WET have explored the nature of the relationship between development and carbon emissions, and whether developing nations will follow the development paths of industrialized countries. MT recognizes that development has generated negative environmental impacts, such as global warming. Yet, it states that economic development can also be the source of the solution. Two explanations for this are structural change/shift that occurs at the macroeco- 'have nots': Groups II, IV, and V nomic level (that leads to less carbon intensive societies), and such technological innovations as energy efficiency, renewable energy sources and -in the future -CO 2 capture and storage, all of whose use is induced by market mechanisms (Grossman & Kruger 1995 , Huang et al. 2008 . As a result of structural change and technological innovations, the environmental impacts of economic growth increase in the early stages of development, but stabilize and then decline as economies mature. The process, also known as the EKC, is depicted by an inverted U-shaped curve.
A key second statement of the MT is that the Kuznets curve is the result of individual countries passing through stages of development and eventually converging to a mature economy. This is due to the change in sectors such as agriculture and fishery to manufacturing industries and their further transformation into service industries as an economy develops. Industrialization, combined with scientific and technological progress, leads to modernization and to a series of processes (e.g. rural migration to urban areas, improvements of living conditions in cities) driving urbanization (Jung et al. 2000) , and allowing countries to deal with their environmental problems through technological innovations.
Convergence has 2 carbon-relevant implications: First, income convergence between developed and developing countries is assumed to occur (Fisher et al. 2007 ) and with it, convergence in carbon emissions. A rich discussion on economic growth and convergence provided the economic background for the series of assumptions on the long-term convergence of income (as measured by GDP per capita) found in the scenario literature (Fisher et al. 2007 , their Section 4.2). Second, by following the development path of industrialized countries, developing countries reduce their environmental problems through technological innovations associated with decreasing carbon intensity (Jung et al. 2000; Stern 2003 , Bertinelli & Strobl 2004 .
The WET also considers carbon intensity as an important test of the threshold in the relationship between development and environment (Roberts & Grimes 1997) . However, it argues that the EKC is not a consequence of individual nations passing through certain stages of development. It is rather the result of a small group of wealthy countries becoming more affluent, powerful and efficient. The WET posits that the world economy is marked by a hierarchy of regions or groups of countries, interlinked by unequal exchanges of capital and resources, which make possible the functioning of the whole economic system (Braudel 1984) . Within a small group of core areas -'the haves' in our classification -is the major concentration of trade, technological innovations, energy and material consumption as well as carbon emissions (Romero Lankao 2004) . Fairly developed middle nations and zones, the 'have somes' in our clustering, contain only some of the benefits, assets and carbon footprints of the core. Some of them constitute the runner-up areas. The huge peripheries, or 'have-nots' in our grouping, rank low in the hierarchy, and have a tiny share of trade, technological innovations, energy consumption and carbon emissions. The peripheries may be located within a nation's boundary or are part of overseas economic zones and empires. Peripheries function as resource-exporting hinterlands, linked to and impacted by core regions through different mechanisms: trade and political domination aimed at finding markets for industrialized goods, supplying cores with raw materials, and in recent decades, offering chances for relocation of carbon-intense activities considered environmentally negative to the cores (Galeano 1978 , Ponting 1991 . Peripheries are relatively more vulnerable to the impacts of a global warming they did not contribute to as much as did core regions (Romero Lankao 2007) .
In the following sections, we explore some of the key drivers of carbon emissions, namely economic growth and structural change resulting in a less carbon-intensive economy; the relationship between size of the economy and total emissions; and whether development of the world is convergent or hierarchical and heterogeneous.
Threshold versus total emissions
The discussion on the applicability of the EKC to GHG emissions is often contentious (Huang et al. 2008) . Some cross-national and cross-sectoral studies have found that the Kuznets hypothesis is supported by empirical evidence when applied to the exploration of the relationship between levels of development and such pollutants as toxic chemicals, sulphur dioxide, and particulates (Stern 2003 , Bertinelli & Strobl 2004 ), but not for pollutants of global impacts such as carbon dioxide. Roberts & Grimes (1997) found that the relation between national carbon intensity and level of economic development has changed from essentially linear in 1965 to essentially curvilinear in 1990. The tendency to an essentially curvilinear relation is still valid for the year 2003 (Fig. 2) . As also reported by Roberts & Grimes (1997) for 1990, the green group or the 'haves' showed a net improvement (decrease) in carbon intensity in 2003 (Fig. 2) . The pink group or the 'have somes' also showed some improvements.
More recent studies found that while the carbon intensity of the global economy improved (i.e. Another picture emerges when the total carbon budget, instead of carbon intensity, is given focus since the former affects the capacity of the carbon pools to absorb GHG emissions (Canadell et al. 2007 ). Proponents of the EKC have been criticized for not paying due attention to the scale effect and the size of a country's economy. In raw quantity, carbon dioxide emissions and energy consumption are closely correlated with the size of a country's economy. Although the relations between total emissions and the size of a country's economy (as measured by total GDP in constant US $) have been weakening since the 1960s, both are still linearly related: r 2 = 0.907, 0.649, and 0.697 for 1960, 1990, and 2003, respectively (Table A3 ). As to the overall effect, even with structural or technological changes aimed at improving the carbon intensity of the economy, total GHG emissions have increased globally at 1.3% annually during the period 1990-1999 and at 3.3% annually from -2006 (Canadell et al. 2007 ). In the 'haves' or green group that is assumed by the MT to promote such requirements for structural change with more efficient infrastructure and stringent pollution controls, total GHG emissions have also increased by 1.04% annually in 1990-1999 and by 1.19% annually in [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] (Fig. 3) . York et al. (2003a) pointed out that not only affluence, but also the structure of an economy (measured by the percentage of GDP not in the service sector), and its levels of urbanization (indicated by the percentage of the population living in urban areas) have impacts opposite to those proposed by the MT. Increases in urbanization correlate with increases in energy consumption and CO 2 emissions per capita (see Fig. 4 ). This implies that high-income, more industrialized and more urbanized economies have higher emissions and energy footprints than lower-income, less industrialized and less urbanized economies. Log(total CO 2 emissions of clusters) (1960-2027) 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 Year Year Fig. 3 . Recent to near future tendencies in (a) total and (b) logged total CO 2 emissions (kt) by cluster. Colors as in Fig. 1 
Scenarios narratives and the convergence hypothesis
As already mentioned, a broad discussion exists within the climate change community on 'the nature of economic processes and whether developing countries will follow the development pathways of industrialized countries with respect to energy use and GHG emissions' (Fisher et al. 2007) . A component of this discussion relevant to this paper is the weight given to the convergence hypothesis within the scenarios literature. Below we review the major scenarios and their use of convergence.
Rather than predicting future developments, scenarios describe plausible trends. However, it is reasonable to expect scenarios to portray the transition from recent and present trajectories to the long-term logic with some degree of plausibility (van Vuuren & O'Neill 2006) . This is because large inconsistencies with historical trajectories and/or near-term expectations would imply that all of the scenario logic is unlikely and even implausible. Moreover, an insufficient fit between scenarios and historical data or short-term trends can undermine the credibility of the scenarios (van Vuuren & O'Neill 2006) . Two groups of narratives within the scenarios literature are pertinent here: the SRES scenarios (IPCC 2000) developed by and for the IPCC, and the scenarios families known as GEO-3, developed by the Global Environment Outlook (GEO) (UNEP 2004) .
The SRES (IPCC 2000) focuses on 6 scenario storylines, grouped into 4 scenario families. They differ in several aspects, e.g. how global regions interrelate, how new technologies diffuse, and how regional economic activities evolve. Two axes define the assumptions of the 4 families: emphasis on continuing globalization (marked as '1') versus regional identity (marked as '2'); and prominence of economic development (marked as 'A') versus social and environmental factors (marked as 'B'). The A1 scenario family describes a world of very rapid economic growth, a population that declines after mid century, and the rapid introduction of new technologies. The A2 scenario family describes a very heterogeneous world. Economic development is mostly regionally orientated, while technological change is more fragmented (IPCC 2000 (IPCC , 2007c . In the B1 scenario family, global solutions to economic, social and environmental sustainability as well as to equity are prominent. The B2 scenario family describes a world that emphasizes local solutions to economic, social and environmental sustainability (IPCC 2000 (IPCC , 2007 . A common feature of these scenarios is the assumption on the long-term convergence of income and total CO 2 emissions between developed and developing nations (Table 1) .
To classify scenarios, GEO uses classes defined by essentially different social visions and variants, which represent a range of possible outcomes within each class. Three broad classes are Conventional World, Barbarization and Great Transitions, respectively characterized by fundamental continuity with current development pathways, essential but unwanted social change, and favorable social transformation (UNEP 2004) . The 2 variants of the Conventional World class share the premises of convergence of developing countries towards the development models of industrialized countries. The Market Forces variant, a market-driven development, differs from the A1 scenario in that economic growth in this variant is accompa- Both SRES and GEO-3 scenarios groups have common features: the way in which the tension between economic growth and environmental limits is resolved; and the commonalities between some storylines (e.g. the SRES-A1 and the GEO-3 Market Forces, Table 2 ). Yet, some differences exist. For example, the SRES scenarios do not consider the implications of international equity and poverty (UNEP 2004). While equity deteriorates in 2 GEO scenarios, namely the Market Forces and Fortress World (UNEP 2004), the SRES scenarios assume a narrowing of the income ratio between developed and developing countries in all scenarios, the narrowing ranging from < 0.5% in the A2 scenario family to < 2% in the A1 family (Table 1) (Fisher et al. 2007 , see also Toth & Wilbanks 2004) . Furthermore, the SRES scenarios provide dates when GDP and emissions in developing countries will reach and even overtake those that prevailed in industrial countries in 1990 (IPCC 2000; Table 1 ).
The discussion on convergence is relevant to carbon emissions for 2 reasons. As found by sensitivity analysis, less convergence usually yields more GHG emissions. For example, in the B2 scenario, an income ratio of 7 (between 11 world regions, in market exchange rates) corresponds to CO 2 emissions of 14.2 Gt C in 2100, while shifting this income ratio to 16 would lead to CO 2 emissions of 15.5 Gt C in 2100. Similar results were also obtained for the A2 scenario (Fisher et al. 2007) . Poor countries and communities can be especially vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. If convergence is not realized, then those countries will lack the financial and human resources to cope with climate change.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
We used our clustering of countries to determine recent to near future tendencies in GDP, GDP per capita and CO 2 emissions (Figs. 3, 5 & 6, respectively) . These extrapolations were created using a least squares fit to estimate parameters for the annual trends of GDP, GDP per capita and CO 2 emissions for each cluster from 1960-2006 and linearly extending the estimates to 2027. Instead of testing for curvilinear or other relationships, 20 yr linear projections were used due to the ease in interpreting the slope as a simple summary of growth. We emphasize that these slopes are a summary of the recent growth in the clusters and that the linear extrapolation is more useful in emphasizing differences among the clusters rather than providing an absolute prediction of future growth. The goal is to see whether these projections are consistent with the idea of convergence as suggested by the SRES (Table 1 , see also van Vuuren & O'Neill 2006) , or whether income disparities increase, as assumed by at least 2 of the narratives of the GEO-3 logic, the Market Forces and the Fortress World (Table 2) .
Figs. 5 & 6 do not show convergence between industrialized and developing countries as assumed by both the MT and the SRES literature. Instead, they illustrate a huge development gap (as measured by GDP and GDP per capita) between the 'haves' and the other 6 clusters of 'have somes' and 'have nots'. The pink 'have somes' is the only group poised to constitute the runner-up area, at least in terms of GDP per capita. This finding supports the WET's statement that development is hierarchical rather than being stage-based (Braudel 1984 , Roberts & Grimes 1997 , Romero Lankao 2004 . Only a few countries have historically been able to move up in the world economy, and the same is currently happening, with only some nations (the pink 'have somes') being able to join the 'haves' group.
When compared with Fig. 2, Fig. 3 shows one of the ironies of modernization. The 'haves' in our classifica- tion are the ones with a net improvement/decrease in carbon intensity (Fig. 2 ). Yet, as suggested in the literature (Stern 2003 , Bertinelli & Strobl 2005 , the same green cluster has been less successful in curbing its total carbon emissions. This group's share of total GHG emissions is the highest and has steadily increased in recent decades. For the 43 yr spanning 1960-2003, its contribution to total carbon emissions is 52.5%. Moreover, a big difference exists between the emissions trajectories of the 'haves' nations on the one hand, and the 'have somes' and 'have nots' nations on the other (Fig. 3a) . Therefore, instead of converging as suggested by the SRES (Table 1 ) and the MT, the 3 indicators (GDP, GDP per capita, and CO 2 emissions) diverge. Three other groups have increased their total emissions: the orange 'have somes' including countries such as China and Thailand, the black 'have somes', including such nations as Iran and South Africa, and the blue 'have nots', including such countries as India and Vietnam (Fig. 3) . 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 1960 1970 1980 1990 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 Log(mean GDP per capita of clusters) Mean GDP per capita of clusters Year Year a b
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Figs. 3, 5 & 6 also show that there is no convergence between developed and developing countries as suggested in Table 1 . Thus, the SRES scenarios do not necessarily portray the transition from recent and present trajectories to the future logic in a way that is consistent with the data. The historical trajectories of change in GDP, GDP per capita and total CO 2 emissions are inconsistent with the idea that developing countries will reach parity and even overtake projected industrial country levels, as suggested in Table 1 . Instead, these trajectories are consistent with 2 GEO narratives: the Market Forces variant where economic growth results in a more skewed income distribution, and the Fortress World where the world moves towards extreme inequality (Table 2) .
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper we explored (a) whether structural change is a key requirement in reducing carbon emissions; (b) whether we also need to focus on the trajectories of total emissions, and (c) whether developing countries follow the development path of industrialized nations, or whether development is suppressed in some areas and augmented in others due to world hierarchy and heterogeneity. In support of findings by other scholars (Roberts & Grimes 1997) , we conclude that countries, in fact, reach a threshold at which the intensity of carbon emissions begins to drop (Fig. 2) . For wealthier countries (the 'haves' and even some 'have somes' in our clustering), this is partly the result of the introduction of more efficient technologies and more stringent pollution controls. Nevertheless, the full applicability of the EKC has been questioned by other scholars (e.g. Canadell et al. 2007 , Raupach et al. 2007 , York et al. 2008 .
The capacity of terrestrial and ocean processes to absorb carbon is naturally dependent on the total amount emitted. Therefore, analysis also needs to focus on total carbon emissions, which have increased globally from 1.3% yearly during the 1990s, to 3.3% during 2000-2006. This is not surprising given that there was little incentive (e.g. increases in fuel prices) to reduce GHG emissions in the 1990s. Total carbon emissions have also increased considerably in the 'haves' and the 'have somes' and even the 'have-nots' countries (i.e. in the green, orange, black and blue clusters). We illustrate here that although the relationship between total emissions and size of a country's economy (as measured by total GDP in constant US $) has been weakening since the 1960s, they are still linearly related.
Rather than supporting the idea of countries passing through stages of development and eventually reducing their pollution through structural change (i.e. the convergence hypothesis), both Figs. 5 & 6 suggest that only a small number of nations have, at least since 1960, successfully been able to notably increase their levels of affluence as measured by GDP and GDP per capita. Thus, poverty and affluence are different facets of the same global economic system, rather than diverse points on a common economic trajectory. Other scholars report that the 'haves' cluster of nations has been successful in addressing local and regional environmental problems. We find here that they have been less successful in curbing total carbon emissions Furthermore, Figs. 3, 5 & 6 show that the recent to near future tendencies in GDP, GDP per capita and CO 2 emissions are not consistent with the idea of convergence as suggested by the SRES. Instead, income disparities are likly to increase as assumed by at least 2 of the narratives of the GEO-3 logic: the Market Forces and the Fortress World. The inconsistency seems to be large enough to make part of the SRES logic implausible or at least unlikely. We suggest that the narratives based on the GEO logic be applied when exploring plausible futures of carbon-relevant change in development paths.
The present findings have several implications for the science of climate change. As suggested by sensitivity analysis, less convergence frequently yields more GHG emissions and increased carbon emissions result in increases in global temperatures. Thus, divergence needs to be associated, not only with the carbon cycle and the mitigation side of the climate change debate, but also with increased climate impacts (the adaptation side). Figs. 5 & 6 suggest that some of the developing countries will not join a convergent development group. Therefore, their populations and economic activities will not have the availability of resources, entitlements, social networks and governance structures deemed particularly important by the IPCC Working Group II Fourth Assessment for them to adapt to the impacts of climate change (Parry et al. 2007 ). 
